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Paradoxically, Massachusetts is the home of a world-class system of private
higher education and a struggling system of public higher education. The
influence of private higher education and persistent indifference by state
government repeatedly thwarted UMass’s ambition to increase its stature
on the national scene. The result was a “boom or bust” cycle of financial
support that made rational planning and institutional expansion extremely
difficult, exacerbating the university’s late start toward world-class status.
he history of higher education in Massachusetts is, at its heart, a
paradox. Widely regarded as the cradle of education in the United
States, Massachusetts is the home state of Horace Mann, the well-known
promoter of public education as the foundation of democracy and informed
citizenship. The state is also renowned, beginning with the establishment of
Harvard College in 1636, as home to a slew of world-class private universi-
ties and liberal arts colleges. Less well known is the history of its public
colleges — the nation’s first public college, Framingham State College, was
established as a normal school in 1839. Yet the state’s public higher educa-
tion system has always been relatively impoverished compared to other
states, serving a minority of the state’s own students and ranking near the
bottom of measures of state financial commitment to higher education.
The nineteenth century history of Massachusetts public higher education
can best be characterized as a quest for legitimacy, as the state sought to
minimize its commitment to the system and campuses sought to expand
beyond their limited role to promote agriculture and teacher education.
Competition over mission and resources hit its peak at the turn of the
century, and never completely resolved. Would Massachusetts strive to have
a public university sector as renowned as its private sector? Or would it rely
upon that private sector to facilitate spending in other areas of the state
economy?
As the twentieth century progressed, the state began to acknowledge and
even expand its commitment to the public system, recognizing that its
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economic future largely depended upon the educational attainment of its
workforce. The University of Massachusetts was formally established in
1947, and a complete system of higher education was forged in 1965.
Finances and enrollments surged dramatically in the 1960s and 1980s. But
when the state’s economic fortunes declined in the late 1980s and early
1990s, the state’s obligation to its public university proved to be quite
fragile.
Thus while the state’s financial outlays increased substantially over the
twentieth century, over the short term the public system often existed in a
“boom or bust” cycle, where large increases in appropriations were allo-
cated in times of surplus, and dramatic cuts were made during recessions.
Rational planning and institutional ambition were often forced to take a
back seat to damage control, political opportunism, and financial survival.
Rather than providing adequate resources for the state’s booming enroll-
ments, prescriptions were made for reforming the state’s governance struc-
ture. The mere existence of the public system itself was often an open
question. Overall, as a result of the influence of a world-class system of
private higher education and hostile factions in state government, the
University of Massachusetts has been thwarted in its ambitions for nearly
150 years, resulting in endemic conflict that has prevented the state from
receiving the full benefits of its public higher education system.
Early History, 1863–1965
The Massachusetts Agricultural College was founded in 1863 by state
leaders in agriculture who were friendly to higher education. The first
president, Henry F. French, was a New Hampshire lawyer and farmer with
no experience as an educator, but was known regionally as the author of
Farm Drainage (1859) and for several articles in The New England
Farmer.1 For its first four years, the state refused to provide any funds for
the college, forcing it to rely solely upon the return from its federal land
grant and its own efforts to secure private support. After negotiating with a
number of interested towns in western Massachusetts, the college settled in
the town of Amherst, which had agreed to a local tax to fund the college
and secured additional financial support from wealthy farmers. The college
opened in October 1867 with a curriculum that focused on the natural
sciences and agriculture, but which also included modern subjects such as
languages and social science. The first students spent weekday mornings in
course lectures and afternoons performing manual labor on the farm.
Although the state would provide some funds in the late 1860s for build-
ings, it remained committed to a policy of “independence” for the new
college.2 The state provided an endowment of $350,000 to meet its legal
obligations under the Morrill Act, but refused to provide annual support. To
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confirm its policy of independence, the state relinquished its power to fill
vacancies on the school’s board of trustees. Simultaneously, as the public’s
early interest in the college faded, first-year enrollment dropped to fewer
than twenty students in 1875. Due to a national depression, income from the
land grant was falling as well, leaving the college in serious danger of
collapse. A state conversation ensued about the future of the college, with
suggestions ranging from demoting the college to a trade school to giving it
away to nearby Amherst College. The state governor suggested closing it
altogether. The college persisted, but as late as 1892, it enrolled only eighty-
eight students and employed only twenty-four faculty.3
Despite its slow start, the college’s trustees and alumni rallied around the
college, and state support reluctantly followed. The composition of the
student body was transformed as public higher education became popular
among the emerging middle class. By 1905, only one-third of the students
came from farming families, while half had fathers in business or the profes-
sions.4 By 1911, M.A.C. had expanded to 23 departments, but it was still
dominated by agriculture and the applied sciences. Horticulture alone
consisted of five departments, and the division added poultry science in
1911 and rural engineering in 1916. Pressure was rising to create a more
traditional public university in Massachusetts, and in 1909, a well-known
businessman, Edmund Dana Barbour, presented a petition to the state
legislature for the creation of a public college in Boston.5 An act approving
the plan was passed in 1910, with the impossible provision that $600,000 be
raised from private sources. Governor Eugene Foss then killed any future
funding for a state university by supporting merit scholarships for students
to attend private universities.
In 1914, a new governor was inaugurated who directed the Board of
Education to study the formation of a state university again. The proposal
alarmed many of the private universities in Boston. “To duplicate the
abundant facilities which Massachusetts already possesses in her different
privately endowed colleges and universities would be a wasteful step and is
one not likely to be taken,” said the Harvard alumni magazine.6  Harvard
president A. Lawrence Lowell appeared before the legislature in February
1915, to argue that a state university would be an institution only for “poor
boys,” reflecting the lack of quality high school education in the state and
needlessly duplicating the academic programs already available at private
colleges. These views were echoed in a 1915 editorial in the Journal of
Education.
A poor boy can go to Harvard, can work his way through, can live on onions
and cabbage if he chooses; but when he is through, his diploma is as aristo-
cratic as that of any student. But if he went to a State University in Massachu-
setts his diploma would have blazoned across its page “from a poor boy’s
college.” All education in Massachusetts is aristocratic. . . . A State University
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in Massachusetts would always be the poor boy’s college and poor boys
would not go there. They would sooner do janitor work, live on stale food,
for the sake of having an aristocratic diploma when they are through. That is
the Massachusetts of it. Our Western friends cannot understand it. They are
democratic. They like the democracy of a State University. To them there is a
heartiness in it that we cannot understand any more than they can understand
the headiness of our Massachusetts ideal. 7
Due to these arguments, and the high cost of starting a new university, the
proposal died in a legislative committee. To add insult to injury, in 1918 a
constitutional amendment brought the college back under government
control, ending the state’s policy of independence. Various proposals for a
state university were made throughout the 1920s and 1930s, to no avail.
A doubling of federal research funding for the campus, through the
Bankhead-Jones Act of 1935, convinced President Hugh Potter Baker to join
an ongoing campaign to create a University of Massachusetts.8 Campus and
alumni leaders lobbied the legislature and executive branch for university
status, but were met mostly with indifference. Hopes were dashed with the
beginning of World War II in December 1941, as war issues became the
highest priority for lawmakers and conscription cut enrollment. Once the
war was over, however, public and legislative interest in a university had
changed dramatically. There were large numbers of young people whose
college education had been postponed for the war, the college-aged popula-
tion was increasing dramatically, and the G.I. Bill gave veterans a free
education in any college chosen. Public awareness of the need for technol-
ogy and professional education had risen with the importance of these
technologies in the war effort. Support came from labor groups, war veter-
ans, and farm bureaus. A bill creating the university was signed into law on
May 6, 1947, making Massachusetts the last major industrial state to
support a public university.
Imagining a World-Class Public University, 1960–95
The name change was a step forward, but the weakness of the public sector
persisted into the 1950s. As late as 1950, public colleges served only about
10 percent of total state enrollment in higher education. By 1960 this had
grown to merely 16 percent, at a time when 59 percent of college students
attended public campuses nationally.9 This lack of access forced the college
to impose extremely high admissions standards. In the 1950s, UMass had
lower admissions rates than both Boston University and Northeastern.10 At
its height in 1957, President Jean Paul Mather could claim that UMass had
the most stringent admissions standards of any public university in the
nation. As a result, UMass students had a higher average family income
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than students attending all of the private urban universities in Boston except
Harvard. UMass would use these characteristics to fuel its ambition to build
a world-class public university that would compete with its private counter-
parts.
The 1960s brought a degree of growth unseen previously in the state, and
with it rising ambitions for the University. John Lederle, a professor of
public administration at the University of Michigan, was inaugurated in
1960 as the University’s fifteenth president. In his inaugural address,
Lederle made a bold statement in favor of expansion and ambition for the
new University, in line with his own experiences at one of the country’s
great public research universities.
As a university we have not only a responsibility to transmit knowledge,
but a responsibility to advance the frontiers of knowledge. . . .  I have
come to feel that what we have here is potentially a giant. I do not mean
merely a bricks and mortar giant, but a great public center for excellence
in higher education in this region.11
Indeed, during the 1960s, the University of Massachusetts grew by leaps
and bounds. From 1960 to 1970, student access improved as enrollment at
UMass more than tripled from 6,030 to 20,835.12 With student enrollment
and economic prosperity came political support. In the “Freedom Act” of
1962, the state gave UMass broad powers of fiscal self-management,
including control over hiring and purchasing.13 This move gave UMass a
degree of management autonomy that was comparable to its public univer-
sity counterparts. State appropriations, which had increased a substantial
8.5 percent per year during President Mather’s tenure, grew an average of
12.8 percent per year from 1960 to 1965, rising to a whopping 23.8 percent
per year from 1965 to 1970.14 Appropriations for capital building projects
averaged $3.6 million per year from 1953 to 1960, $8.2 million from 1961
to 1965, and an incredible $50.6 million from 1965 to 1970. Campuses were
added in Boston and Worcester.
Despite its massive growth, the historical artifacts of the University’s
agricultural beginnings remained. In the early 1960s, the school of agricul-
ture still had a disproportionate share of the campus budget, and its best-
known programs were in food technology, zoology, and science education.
The University had a fledgling medical school, no law school, and no busi-
ness program “suitable for training top-level corporation executives.”15
UMass was still seen by Harvard’s Christopher Jencks and David Riesman
as vocational education for the masses.
The upper-middle class student in California, if hostile to the presumptive
conventionality of Stanford undergraduates, can choose Berkeley with confi-
dence in its academic resources. A comparable student in Massachusetts can
see no real alternative to the private colleges like Harvard even if he objects
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to their arrogance or complacency. Public education seems to him merely
technical training rather than a real initiation.16
Thus, even by the mid 1960s, institutional ambition and expansion were
leavened by the state’s intellectual and political culture. Intellectually, the
university was still merely a niche among the state’s research institutions,
providing technical education to the lower-middle-class student. This would
be a boon to the University during this period. The legislature came to be
dominated by Boston’s Irish Catholic politicians, many of whom were
educated in the public system, had an antipathy toward Harvard’s exclu-
sionary admissions policies, or saw young people being priced out of Catho-
lic universities, Boston College in particular. Thus, as legitimacy and fund-
ing grew during the 1960s, UMass saw its ambitions rising to those of the
great public universities.
Lederle’s presidency would prove to be a “golden age” for the University
of Massachusetts. The state codified a new governance structure for public
higher education under the Willis-Harrington Act of 1965, simultaneously
reducing public-private conflict and producing endemic conflict with state
government.17 Exacerbating tensions, student demonstrations, the Vietnam
War, and a declining national economy dampened the public’s enthusiasm
for higher education. By the early 1970s, it was also obvious that the state’s
projections for future student enrollment had been highly optimistic.18
During each of the following three decades, the system would face fiscal
crises that restrained campus prosperity and state university ambition. The
system would also face political crises, including presidential misappropria-
tion of funds and sexual misconduct. Intense competition for resources in the
1970s and 1980s would lead to dramatic conflicts between campus presi-
dents and state government. Managing these conflicts dominated public
higher education in Massachusetts during this period, undermining state
support for increasing the stature of its public university.
Competition between the public and private sectors ameliorated, but
hardly disappeared. As late as 1974, private college presidents suggested a
moratorium on capital expenditures, and wanted public tuition prices to be
set at levels comparable with the state’s private universities.19 Expanding
the public sector may be necessary, renowned higher education scholar
Howard Bowen argued, “but to do so in ways that would drive out substan-
tial parts of the private sector would be grossly wasteful.”20 These conflicts
persisted well into the 1970s, but gradually declined as the major private
universities no longer saw the university as a credible threat. Once the state
committed itself to scholarship aid for Massachusetts residents to attend
private colleges, their policy concerns gravitated toward the federal govern-
ment. The attention of UMass turned sharply toward the governor’s office.
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The first major conflict of this new era came between Governor Michael
Dukakis and Robert C. Wood, the ambitious UMass president who suc-
ceeded John Lederle. Wood, a well-known scholar of city and urban plan-
ning, was a veteran of Lyndon B. Johnson’s “Great Society” programs,
serving as Secretary and Undersecretary of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment from 1966 to 1969. A nationally respected scholar and politician,
Wood seemed ideally suited to take UMass to the next level. Wood opened a
presidential office in downtown Boston and expanded his staff. The faculty
at Amherst, who had been completely shut out of the process of Wood’s
appointment, were particularly unhappy with the new arrangement. Even
as state appropriations declined, Wood created a new level of administra-
tion in Boston previously unseen at the university.
Compounding the problem, Wood never enjoyed the political and finan-
cial support of his predecessor. Politicians and the public were angered by
the student demonstrations of the late 1960s and early 1970s, believing they
demonstrated a lack of willpower on the part of campus administrators to
control student behavior.21 There was also a widespread belief that UMass
expansion had come at the expense of the state and community colleges,
which had not benefited as greatly from the state’s largesse during the
1960s. The state’s private colleges, concerned by the stagnating economy,
continued to vocally oppose any further expansion of the public system. The
Massachusetts Public-Private Forum, designed to facilitate inter-institutional
cooperation, dissolved in March 1976 after Boston University president
John Silber delivered a caustic speech attacking the wastefulness and
redundancy of the public sector.22
Most disastrously, Wood engaged in open conflict with the new governor.
Both men were graduates of elite private colleges, Wood at Princeton and
Harvard, Dukakis at Swarthmore and Harvard Law. Both came from
lower-middle-class backgrounds, Wood the son of a shoe salesman and
Dukakis the son of Greek immigrants. But unlike Wood, Dukakis never
supported public higher education’s ambitions. Despite being widely re-
garded as a liberal, Dukakis announced in November 1974 that he sup-
ported a 30 percent cut in the public higher education budget.
His policy actions seemed designed to agitate Wood. Dukakis refused to
allow the medical campus to occupy its new facilities in Worcester, im-
pounded construction funds for UMass Boston, and refused to allow the
UMass president’s office to fill any vacant positions in the system.23 To
Wood, these budget battles were not only a financial attack on the univer-
sity, but a direct attempt to bring the University of Massachusetts under the
control of the executive branch.24 Wood responded in kind, going to court to
assert the University’s right to fiscal autonomy. Simultaneously, he worked
with friendly legislators to restore many of the Dukakis budget cuts, and to
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win support for the Medical School in Worcester, which finally established
its campus and graduated its first class of 16 MDs in 1974.25
The conflict between Wood and Dukakis became deeply personal. Wood,
an outgoing and extroverted personality, enjoyed the perquisites of univer-
sity leadership and statesmanship.26 The president’s office rented office
space in Boston’s pricey financial district, further antagonizing the parsimo-
nious Dukakis. But ultimately it was the governor who had the upper hand.
A no-confidence vote by the Amherst faculty, driven by Wood’s tendency to
micromanage affairs on the campus, hurt his standing in the state. Dukakis
began replacing members of the UMass Board of Trustees with his own
supporters, and Wood’s position with his own board became tenuous. After
briefly trying out a campaign for governor against Dukakis, Wood reluc-
tantly resigned in 1977.
Financially, the system was in bad shape. In the early 1970s, both state
appropriations for operating expenses and capital operations were stag-
nant.27 Despite strong appropriation increases in the 1960s, the state still
ranked forty-ninth in per capita spending. Eventually, the stagflation
economy of the 1970s took its toll even on existing levels of support. In
1976, Governor Dukakis cut state support for higher education, and faculty
would not receive salary raises for three years. Economic conditions im-
proved in the late 1970s, but Dukakis was not inclined to place the state’s
surplus funds in public higher education. The proportion of the state budget
allocated to higher education steadily declined, from 7.5 percent in fiscal
year 1973 to 5.65 percent in fiscal year 1980.
Dissatisfaction among policymakers with the existing governance struc-
ture flared during the 1970s.28 No less than seventeen different proposals for
reorganization were made during the decade, but there was little consensus
on its proper direction. The executive branch was concerned over the lack
of efficiency and fiscal controls resulting from the coordinating board’s lack
of budget authority. The legislative branch sought protection from the
barrage of campus demands, with each making their case for increased
funding through local legislators. But powerful politicians, particularly
Amherst’s James Collins, the House education committee chairman, were
opposed to any change that could possibly damage the hard-won autonomy
of the university system.29 With Collins in opposition, it seemed impossible
for any form of reorganization to pass the legislature.
Supporters found a way around Collins through a last-minute amendment
to the state budget. The substance of the reorganization shocked the higher
education community, who were completely unprepared for the swiftness of
the proceedings. The legislature created the Board of Regents for Higher
Education (BOR), a governing board with powers unmatched in any other
state. The Regents had governing level authority over every campus,
including day-to-day management authority. Annual budgets were to be
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submitted to the Regents for approval, but funds would be appropriated for
the entire system in a single line item to the BOR.30 The Regents had the
power to approve and discontinue academic programs, and even to merge
or discontinue existing campuses. Thus, the legislature granted the BOR a
significant amount of its own power to distribute funds to their districts, in
the hope that the Regents would improve the efficiency of the system,
engage in strategic planning, and protect them from the campuses’ endless
requests for money.31
Among those interested in state policy for higher education, the Board of
Regents was a fascinating experiment in governance reform, according to
American University president Stephen Trachtenberg.
Pulled together in an abbreviated way, the mandate of the Board of Regents
has a sweep and power that, against the background of previous decades in
higher education, can only be described as awesome. The only appropriate
historical parallel may be the moment when the fiefdoms of the Middle Ages
definitively faded away and the centralized monarchy of a Louis XIV, comple-
mented by an efficient nationwide bureaucracy, put in its magnificent appear-
ance. . . . The genial and expensive chaos that has long characterized higher
education in Massachusetts, as in other states, is to come to an end, and is to
be replaced by a system which, though it makes no utopian claims, does
aspire to an almost mathematical ideal of accountability.32
In response, John B. Duff, the first chancellor of the Board of Regents, joked
that if “L’état c’est moi,” the most appropriate retort would be, “Après moi
le deluge.”33  Duff’s joke turned out to be remarkably prophetic. In Decem-
ber 1985, Duff resigned when it was discovered that he had solicited dona-
tions from Regents for the House speaker’s reelection campaign. Paul
Ylvisaker, one of Dukakis’s former professors at Swarthmore, chaired a
search committee to find his replacement. Representative Collins of
Amherst, still licking his wounds from the reorganization controversy, made
a determined play for the chancellor’s office. Regents who had been ap-
pointed by former Governor Ed King quickly supported the appointment of
Collins, who was well liked and Irish Catholic to boot. Ironically, Collins
was now in a position to become chancellor of the board that he had op-
posed so vigorously.
The anti-Collins forces were equally powerful, and most importantly,
were supported by Governor Dukakis. Ylvisaker was determined to bring
the search process to an appropriate conclusion, and he favored contenders
with academic backgrounds.34 Collins made it to the search committee’s
short list, along with a number of academic contenders. By this point, the
search had become public and highly politicized. Collins opponents publicly
derided him as a “hack politician” without appropriate academic qualifica-
tions, having earned a law degree but no doctorate. In a particularly petty
move, an aide to Governor Dukakis leaked Collins’s unimpressive law
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school transcript to The Boston Globe. These attacks antagonized state
legislators, who were beginning to see them as an insult to their own honor.
In May 1986, House speaker George Keverian declared that he would hold
up an important chancellor’s pay raise bill unless Collins was made a final-
ist. The pay raise was a key issue: Many of the search committee’s top
choices were not interested in the position if it came with its legislatively
mandated salary of $65,000, but Collins was.
This did not impress the search committee, which eliminated Collins in
the final round. Subsequently, according to one observer, “the sense of
urgency in the Collins camp bordered on frenzy.”35 The terms of three
Collins supporters on the Board of Regents were about to expire. During the
July board meeting, the Collins supporters refused to vote for any of the
finalists, thus seemingly ending the search in a stalemate. Instead, a Collins
supporter moved to rescind the search committee and to accept nominations
from the floor. Collins was nominated and appointed with eight votes,
taking Governor Dukakis completely by surprise. His education adviser and
liaison to the Regents, Gerard Indelicato, had convinced the Regents of the
governor’s support and subsequently failed to inform Dukakis of the status
of the search. In doing so, Indelicato was trying to ensure the appointment
of Collins and, through the support of the Collins faction, ensure his own
appointment to the presidency of Bridgewater State College.
Dukakis moved quickly. To him, Collins was simply unqualified for the
post, and politically he could not allow himself to be outplayed so publicly.36
Dukakis replaced the Regents chairman immediately with supporter Ed-
ward Lashman, who was instructed to begin proceedings to remove Collins.
Lashman offered Collins a contract of only ninety days, which Collins
refused. Lashman then went on an extended vacation, giving Dukakis the
time he needed to appoint three new Regents. Collins was quickly ousted
and Franklyn Jenifer, the head of academic affairs for the New Jersey
system, was selected as the new chancellor. The debacle was over, but
strained relationships with the legislature and the governor’s office would
persist for the rest of the Dukakis administration.
The Collins fiasco was not the only serious political problem facing the
public higher education system during the mid 1980s. Numerous scandals
involving campus presidents infuriated state legislators and the public.
Gerard Indelicato, who had played such an infamous role in the Collins/
Dukakis conflict, was forced to resign from the presidency of Bridgewater
State College and imprisoned for two and one-half years after being found
guilty of defrauding the state of adult education funds. Francis Pilecki, the
president of Westfield State College, resigned in 1986 after it was disclosed
that he made a $10,000 payment to a male student he allegedly seduced.
The succeeding president, Irving Buchen, resigned in July 1988 after billing
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college trust funds for personal expenses. UMass Boston chancellor Robert
Corrigan resigned for similar reasons. The same year, Salem State College
president James Amsler resigned after using $65,000 from trust funds for a
self-promoting brochure.
Despite the Collins appointment and other scandals, the state’s public
colleges, and UMass in particular, enjoyed somewhat of a resurgence after
years of spartan Dukakis budgets. Boston politicians in the legislature
continued to support the public higher education system despite Dukakis’s
indifference. Surging revenues in state coffers provided years of surplus
funds that greatly improved the financial situation of higher education, and
student enrollment rebounded after the demographic slump of the late 1970s
and early 1980s. Outside observers began to take notice of the transforma-
tion. In 1986, UMass Boston was named one of the country’s nine “hot
colleges” in Time magazine. Perhaps even more impressively, the Amherst
campus was raised to a four-star rating in the Fiske Guide to Colleges. By
1988, the state’s per capita spending on public higher education had risen to
$188, making it forty-first out of the fifty states.37 In per student funding,
the state now ranked a respectable twelfth.38 There was genuine optimism
about the future of the University on the national scene.
Sadly, this era did not last long. The “economic bubble” fueled by dra-
matically increasing corporate profits and Reagan-era tax cuts had burst by
late 1988. Massachusetts particularly benefited due to its concentration of
defense contractors and high-technology firms near Route 128. Governor
Dukakis was quick to take credit, and parlayed his role in the “Massachu-
setts Miracle” into the Democratic presidential nomination in 1988. It was
not until 1989, after his presidential ambitions had been dashed, that
Dukakis was willing to make the necessary cuts to state appropriations. By
this time the state’s economic condition was bleak. In fiscal year 1990, the
state had a budget deficit of $1.1 billion.39 The state did not have a “rainy
day” fund to cover declining revenues. Due to its policy of heavy borrow-
ing, the state’s bond rating was the lowest of any state, raising the interest
rates that the state had to pay on future debt. Dukakis, as he had done at
the start of his first term in 1976, chose to have higher education endure a
disproportionate burden of cuts.
The legislature’s support proved weak in the face of a fiscal crisis and in
the wake of the staggering series of political scandals tied to the system.
Because the BOR was tied so closely in the post-Collins years to the
Dukakis administration, it was not in the position to make the case for
reduced cuts. Between 1988 and 1991, when adjusted for inflation, state
appropriations for public higher education fell by an incredible 33 percent.40
In real dollars, state funds declined from $757 million in fiscal year 1988 to
$588 million in fiscal year 1991. In spring semester 1989, more than 1400
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students who had been admitted to a state college received letters telling
them not to enroll. In the fall semester, 9000 admissible students were
rejected and 1100 course sections were cancelled.
UMass president David Knapp, understanding that the university needed
far more political and financial support if it aspires to national stature,
urged his trustees to appoint a blue-ribbon commission on the future of the
university in 1989. University of California president emeritus David Saxon
was recruited to lead the panel. The Commission’s report was unequivocal:
the existing public universities needed to be brought into the University of
Massachusetts, and the UMass Board of Trustees needed to be vested with
all governance authority over its campuses.41 Further, they argued, the
university should make its annual budget request directly to the legislature
as a single lump sum, which would provide a measure of fiscal autonomy.
The Saxon report proved to be the first volley in a campaign to unseat the
Board of Regents. The appointment of Franklyn Jenifer had inaugurated a
more activist and intrusive administration at the Board of Regents, antago-
nizing public college leaders.42 The state and community colleges com-
plained bitterly that the Regents were not advocating for their needs. All of
the campuses resented so much state oversight over prerogatives that in
other states were vested in the campuses. The Regents were ultimately
brought down, however, because they simply failed to exercise their gover-
nance rights. In spite of its broad statutory authority, the BOR had del-
egated many of its governance powers to campus boards of trustees. Thus
the BOR managed to combine the downside of both state bureaucracies and
local control, by failing to protect the legislature from campus leaders and
conflict resolution.
Changes in leadership helped to accelerate the fall of the Regents.43 In
December 1989, deeply hurt by calls in the House of Representatives to
abolish the Regents, Chancellor Jenifer accepted the presidency of his alma
mater, Howard University. Dukakis handed over the governorship to
William F. Weld, a graduate of Harvard College and Harvard Law, in 1991.
Finally, in June of that year, Regents chairman Paul Tsongas left the board
to seek the presidency of the United States. There was a consensus among
lawmakers that the time was ripe for change, and that political machina-
tions like those associated with the Reorganization Act would be unneces-
sary. The new governance structure decentralized authority to the Univer-
sity of Massachusetts and created a new coordinating agency, the Higher
Education Coordinating Council, with greatly reduced staff and statutory
authority. As recommended by the Saxon commission, the five universities
of the state were now under the authority of the UMass president’s office in
Boston.
The council’s political support from the Weld administration was no
better than it had been under Dukakis. Weld, like Dukakis, made it clear
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that he believed public higher education to be a pale shadow of the state’s
private institutions. During his first term, Weld advocated closing or merg-
ing four or five state colleges to save money. Even before his inauguration
as governor, Weld solicited a confidential report from Northeastern law
professor Deborah Ramirez to make a case for the idea. Later, in February
1991, Weld aide Stephen Tocco made the governor’s position clear. “We
aren’t considering the [higher] education system we have out there as
wonderful,” Tocco said. “We’re not buying into the idea that it’s so great it
shouldn’t be touched . . . we think there’s a lot of duplication and ineffi-
ciency.”44
Advocacy from the public system was weak at best; the only major
player during the fiscal crisis was the University of Massachusetts. UMass
president Joseph Duffey made it clear to the Weld administration that the
university would accept budget cuts in exchange for independence from the
Board of Regents, according to former Administration and Finance secre-
tary Peter Nessen.
Going to those pockets [in public higher education] was not a matter of
great principle but rather based on the fact that the advocacy was weak or
was diffused whereas, in other areas, there was stronger advocacy. We had
to be able to do things quickly without being held up and those discretion-
ary areas allowed us to do that. The only strong advocacy was from the
university system and they used the opportunity to spin off as independent.
And we did not really care about that as long as they didn’t care about the
cut, so it was really the trade off that we made in order to get the dollars
that we needed.45
The new coordinating agency was seemingly incapable of making the case
for reducing the cuts. The resignation of Franklyn Jennifer and Paul Tsongas
left a vacuum in state leadership. “We didn’t hear from them. We only heard
from the university,” Nessen said. “That was the only force and it was
compounded because Governor Weld was close to the [UMass] board and
listened to their case, and was less troubled with this request for splitting
out and going independent.”46
Public support for the state’s higher education system was equally weak.
In January 1991 an unsigned editorial in the Boston Herald crystallized this
sentiment.
Fat, lumbering, expensive to feed, one of the most sacred cows in Massa-
chusetts is the state-subsidized network of colleges and universities... If
Governor Weld is in earnest about reducing government spending, let him
take a pair of pruning shears to the overgrown ivy choking the state’s
budget. In the land-grant states of the Midwest and West, it may have
required taxpayer dollars to promote excellence in higher education. That
was never the case in Massachusetts. . . . Where is the need for
Framingham State College or the University of Lowell or Middlesex
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Community College? Do Massachusetts taxpayers really need to maintain
the costly glut of state-supported schools?47
During the last three years of the Dukakis administration, state appropria-
tions for public higher education had fallen by 33 percent when adjusted for
inflation.48 As a proportion of the state budget, higher education fell from
6.5 percent of the budget in FY1988 to 4.4 percent in FY1994, a drop of
nearly one-third in six years. In competition with other elements of the
discretionary budget, higher education was faring very poorly. Taken as a
whole, the six-year period between 1988 and 1994 represented the largest
disinvestment in the history of U.S. public higher education.
In response, the system cut 1711 full-time equivalent positions from the
state payroll.49 Spending on academic instruction was cut by five percent.
Most disturbing, however, was the impact of state budget cuts on students.
In just two years, from FY1990 to FY1992, state scholarship aid was cut by
more than half, from $77.6 million to $35.0 million. The maximum award
for the neediest students was also cut in half, from $3800 to $1900.50 State
scholarship aid fell so low that the state was forced to return $2 million in
financial aid to the U.S. Department of Education for failing to meet federal
requirements for minimum support.
At the same time, the burden of state appropriation cuts was placed
almost entirely on students through increases in tuition and fees. UMass
president Joseph Duffey believed that if UMass were priced equivalently
with the University of Michigan, the public would believe it was equally
good. It was a tragic error in judgment. Between FY1988 and FY1994,
tuition rose an average of 48 percent, and fees, which constituted more than
half of student costs, rose 240 percent. The overall cost to students more
than doubled over the period, increasing 113 percent. Student response was
equally dramatic. Applications for freshman admission declined precipi-
tously, from 24,000 in 1988 to just 14,000 in 1991, raising the admissions
rate from 50 percent to 83 percent in just three years.51
The state’s handling of the fiscal crisis created a sense of panic and
instability on the public campuses.52 Each year the fiscal crisis worsened,
entailing further and further cuts. In addition, each year there was at least
one “reversion,” a budget cut that was made mid-year to balance the state
budget. From FY1988 to FY1991, there were ten reversions that cumula-
tively averaged 4 percent per year, making it very difficult for campuses to
plan their annual budgets in a rational manner. Benefits such as worker’s
compensation and unemployment insurance, once paid through the central
state account, now had to be paid out of campus funds, creating a hidden de
facto cut in appropriations. As a result, faculty and staff morale plummeted.
The state’s four-year colleges eliminated 48 academic programs, often very




The state colleges spent the last years of the Weld administration recover-
ing from the fiscal crises of the previous six years. State financial support
during these years was not spectacular, mainly due to Governor Weld’s
ambivalence about public higher education. In the early days of Weld’s
administration, he was clearly antagonistic toward public higher education,
and was largely responsible for the disproportionate impact of state budget
cuts on the higher education system. Over time, however, Weld’s position
changed, and at one point he supported a plan to make UMass “as good as
the University of Michigan by 1998.”54 Yet as late as 1995, Weld’s budget
called for a $25 million cut in state appropriations, to be replaced by a
$12.5 million fund that would match private donations dollar for dollar. At
best, the system would emerge with level funding; at worst, it would sustain
a 4 percent cut. He also vetoed the faculty’s collective bargaining contract,
further damaging campus morale. To many campus leaders, Weld’s position
on public higher education seemed to change from day to day.
The state’s media, particularly the Boston Globe and Boston Herald,
continued to highlight weaknesses in the public system. Alice Dembner of
the Globe led a series of reports in 1995 investigating the impact of the
fiscal crisis on the University’s struggle for national recognition.55 The series
portrayed UMass as a conflicted institution trying to manage competing
goals. Raising academic standards while improving the profile of the
campus’s sports teams, trying to improve teaching while simultaneously
gaining recognition for its research, and trying to become more selective
while still maintaining access. These conflicts were played out in an envi-
ronment where the legislature and the public viewed the campus as inferior.
Three decades ago, President John Lederle envisioned the University of
Massachusetts as a “potential giant,” comparable to the state universities
of Michigan and California. Today, many are worried that its potential
will never be realized. More than four years after the state molded a new
UMass out of five disparate campuses, and more than two years into
Michael Hooker’s presidency, the university remains hobbled by campus
parochialism and lukewarm support from politicians and the public.56
The Globe series noted a number of problems faced by the campus, and
focused particularly on declining admissions standards. In fall 1994, UMass
Amherst admitted 85 percent of its applicants, only 12 percent of whom had
graduated in the top 10 percent of their high school class. During the 1960s
and 1970s, due to its policy of limited enrollment, UMass Amherst had some
of the highest average SAT scores in the nation. By 1994, the average SAT
score had fallen to 994, when it had been 1050 just five years earlier.
These revelations did substantial damage to the perception of academic
quality at UMass among legislators, the state board, and the public. The
conservative columnist for the Boston Globe used the SAT data to inveigh
against the existence of public higher education in Massachusetts.
60
New England Journal of Public Policy
What a sorry farce the state university and colleges of Massachusetts have
become. What a mockery of excellence in education. Anywhere else they
would be an embarrassment. In Massachusetts, which for 350 years has
been the heart of American higher learning, they are a humiliation . . .
Sentimental attachments aside, shouldn’t the government of Massachusetts
be getting out of the business of operating four-year colleges and universi-
ties?57
Governor Weld, understanding that public higher education needed serious
leadership and attention, appointed James F. Carlin, a former cabinet officer
and UMass trustee, as chairman of the newly designated Board of Higher
Education. Carlin repeated many of the same attacks against the university
—  that it lacked admissions standards, was rife with remedial students, and
offered duplicative academic programs. Carlin was especially angered by
the sharp increases in tuition and fees and cuts in financial aid during the
Dukakis and Weld administrations, which he had approved as a UMass
trustee.58 The weakness of UMass in 1995 would lead to an activist govern-
ing board in Massachusetts that would make national headlines.59
Conclusion
The story of Massachusetts public higher education is consumed by ques-
tions of institutional mission and system development. In the early nine-
teenth century, the normal schools considered their appropriate role —
indeed, the appropriate role for higher education for the lower and middle
classes — in Massachusetts society. Together, the normal schools and the
Massachusetts Agricultural College fought for legitimacy and recognition
from a state that was indifferent and even antagonistic to their develop-
ment. In the twentieth century, as the need for a system of public higher
education became more widely accepted by the public, the ambitions of the
university system rose, but political support rarely followed. The result was
a “boom or bust” policy from the state that provided surplus funds when
revenues were high and staggering decreases when revenues were low.
Unlike most states, questions of system development in Massachusetts
have been deeply influenced by the demands of the private sector. Commis-
sions developed to study the future role of public higher education were
often exclusively composed of the presidents of private institutions. Private
campus presidents consistently opposed any increase in the number of public
campuses or the range of academic programs offered. It was only when
enrollment and funding were plentiful — during the immediate post-war
period and the mid 1960s — that the private universities allowed the state
to expand the system. As late as 1995, conservative commentators and
private university presidents questioned whether the public higher education
system should exist at all60 or should expand and grow into new areas.61
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Public higher education in Massachusetts has never been taken for granted,
leaving the system threatened and vulnerable.
The prestige of the large public university systems in California, Michi-
gan, and North Carolina served to provide the seeds of ambition. The
prestige of public universities has largely depended upon expansion of the
research function, but this role was never enthusiastically supported in the
Massachusetts legislature. Some believe that the state’s late start in the
research university business has ensured a persistent lack of support for its
ambitions.
Lederle aspired to make Amherst another Berkeley or Ann Arbor. His
model, in other words, was the great public university of the day, with an
eminent, research-oriented faculty and strong and influential graduate
programs. But as Lederle well knew, legislators, and by extension the
public, give money chiefly for undergraduate education. Berkeley and Ann
Arbor were able to become premier research and graduate centers in part
because they had already provided a century of large-scale, high-quality
undergraduate education, from which tens of thousands of California and
Michigan opinion-makers had benefited. They had, that is, already formed
a mass political base that ensured sympathetic hearings in the Michigan
and California legislatures and continued high-level funding. . . . Lederle
tried to short-circuit this process by moving directly to greatness in research
and graduate work. From a legislative standpoint this is a foundation of
sand, unable to sustain a strong institution through difficult times.62
This lack of political support has been endemic in Massachusetts. Notably,
the period of greatest legislative support for expansion, from the late 1950s
through the early 1970s, was when UMass graduates dominated both the
House and Senate. Irish Catholic legislators, often serving a constituency of
the lower and middle classes, clearly saw a need for a public higher educa-
tion system that could provide a low cost, high quality education for social
mobility.
Lack of political support inevitably leads to lack of financial support
when times are tight. This was particularly the case during the fiscal crises
of the Dukakis and Weld administrations, when the combination of illegiti-
macy, fiscal stress, and decreasing autonomy proved to be volatile. The
state was more than willing to draw funds from the public higher education
system when other needs were pressing — rarely out of malice, but merely
political expediency. These same factors made the state’s governing board
virtually incapable of the rational planning and strategic decision making
necessary to manage a growing crisis. They also led the University to make
decisions to dramatically increase student tuition and fees that resonate to
this day. While the system often suffered from a lack of leadership, its
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leaders were placed in a politicized environment that was virtually unman-
ageable.
In recent years, the role of private universities in state systems of higher
education has emerged as an important public policy issue. The National
Center for Public Policy and Higher Education (NCPPHE) began issuing a
report card in 2001 of state performance for higher education called Mea-
suring Up.63 In a controversial decision, NCPPHE decided to include private
universities in the report, specifically impacting their analysis of student
access to higher education. As a result, states that provide financial aid to
students attending private universities will rate higher than states that focus
all of their resources on public higher education. Indeed, Massachusetts
faired poorly in its rating for student access for precisely this reason, despite
large increases in financial aid to lower-income students in the late 1990s.
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